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Plaintiff-Appellant

attorneys of record,

Gem State Rooﬁng Incorporated (“Gem State”), by and through its

McFarland

Ritter

PLLC,

respectfully ﬁles this Appellant’s Brief in support

of its appeal of the District Court’s September

17,

2019 Judgment and the

related

December

13,

2019 Order Re: Attorney Fees and Costs.
I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature 0f the Case

Gem State has continuously operated a rooﬁng business
2000. In

May 2002,

Boise-based

Gem State Rooﬁng & Asphalt Maintenance,

State-Boise”), the predecessor t0 Defendant-Respondent United

began providing competing rooﬁng services

name “Gem

State

In 2005,

in Blaine County, Idaho since

in Blaine County,

Inc. (herein,

“Gem

Components Incorporated,

under the confusingly similar

Rooﬁng.”

Gem State and Gem State-Boise

“Trademark Settlement Agreement”
pursuant to the TSA, that

provided similar services;

(i)

(referred t0 herein as the

their business

(iii)

there

avoided litigation by entering into a

was a

sponsorship of their respective services;

“TSA”). The Parties agreed,

names were confusingly

similar;

(ii)

the Parties

likelihood of confusion as to the source, origin, and

(iv)

Gem State-Boise would permanently cease

advertising and soliciting business in Blaine County; (V)

Gem State-Boise would permanently

cease providing rooﬁng services in Blaine County; and (Vi) if Gem State-Boise received a
request t0 perform

work

in Blaine County,

it

would

direct the requesting

customer t0

Gem State.

In 2010,

Gem State-Boise began Violating the TSA by submitting bids to customers

in

Blaine County.
In 201

1,

in

an effort to disentangle himself from an IRS dispute, the owner of Gem State-

Boise changed the business name t0 United Components

Inc. (herein,

“UCI”), but continued

business from the same location, using the same employees, equipment, logo, and phone number,

and working with the same customers. The business name change emboldened the owner

more egregiously breach

the

TSA, and UCI bid and worked on

County, culminating in a proj ect for the
earned

UCI nearly $300,000
Neither

as the

Gem

to

multiple proj ects in Blaine

Wood River Valley Animal

Shelter in

2018 Which

in revenue.

State-Boise nor

UCI

ever referred a Blaine County customer t0

Gem State,

TSA required.
After

directly,

and

Gem State

Gem State’s repeated demands that UCI cease work in Blaine County — ﬁrst
later Via

ﬁled

counsel

— and

Gem

suit to enforce its rights

State-Boise’s repeated

under the TSA. The ensuing

UCI’S repeated ﬂaunting 0f discovery rules and the
accountable, Which prevented

one-day court

trial,

in

District

Boise had acted in Violation 0f the TSA,

Court found

(ii)

but

litigation

was marked by

District Court’s refusal t0 hold

Gem State from fully proving its case.

which the

0f those demands,

rej ection

(i)

that

The

UCI and its

suit

UCI

culminated in a

predecessor

Gem

State-

Gem State had failed t0 prove it was damaged,

(iii)

that

Gem State was not entitled t0 any relief — monetary 0r injunctive,

side

was

entitled t0 recover its attorneys’ fees.

and

(iv) that neither

B

Course 0f Proceedings

On July 20,

1.

2018,

Gem State ﬁled the

Complaint Which

initiated this action,

claiming a right to injunctive relief and damages for breach of contract, breach 0f the covenant of

good

faith

and

2.

trademark infringement, and unjust enrichment. R.,

fair dealing,

The

parties

p.

00001

1.

immediately commenced written discovery. After months 0f UCI

refusing t0 provide full and complete responses,

Gem State

ﬁled a Motion to Compel 0n January

28, 2019. R., pp. 000057-172.

3.

On February 6,

the narrow issues 0f Whether

(ii)

bound by the TSA, and
4.

2019,

(i)

(iii)

On February

13,

UCI was

a successor entity t0

in breach

of the TSA. R.,

2019,

000369. UCI’S cross-motion was
grant

On March 4,

served, and several

0n the Motion
pages

it

to

weeks

ﬁled

its

own Motion

0f Gem State’s claims. R.,

Motion

t0

Compel was

for

Summary Judgment.

State’s:

p.

UCI

On April

3,

Gem State’s

R., p.

asked the Court to

000379.

initial

discovery requests were

ﬁled, but just days before the hearing

Compel, UCI produced 1,031 pages of documents, compared
t0

and, thereby,

000369.

p.

2019, some six months after the

after the

had produced prior

6.

UCI

Gem State—Boise,

much broader than was Gem

UCI summary judgment 0n all
5.

Gem State ﬁled a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 0n

to the total

0f

1

18

ﬁling 0f its Motion to Compel. R., pp. 000356-363.

2019, the District Court granted

Gem State’s Motion t0 Compel, but

“deferred ruling 0n an award 0f costs and attorney fees.” R., p. 000367.

7.

On April 26,

Parties’ cross-motions for

2019, the Court entered

its

summary judgment, ﬁnding:

Memorandum Decision and Order on the

UCI

b.

The

c.

UCI breached the

d.

Gem State’s unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed, but UCI’S Motion for

is

a successor to

TSA is

enforceable against

UCI has

8.

under the

Compel —

it

UCI

TSA is the

UCI refused to comply with the

admitted

it

documents

that could

UCI had produced

Gem State needed the documents

predecessor

State-Blaine

Gem

.

.

.

“UCI does not

emails.” R., p. 000458.

(ii)

for an

be recovered have

and emails

(i)

t0

“t0 take

the Blaine

prove

it

its

damages

case,

Gem

...”

as established that, but for

State

UCI’S

Trademark Settlement Agreement,

County jobs

that

award 0f costs and attorneys’ fees

dispute. R., pp. 000394, 404-407.

now been produced

almost no documents relevant to damages, and

State-Boise’s) Violation 0f the

would have obtained

obtained,” and

to maintain

Order t0

were provided through subpoena, and UCI does not have a method 0f recovery

000458. Given that

its

District Court’s April 3

had deleted responsive emails: “UCI did not maintain 0r keep many of

ﬁled a Motion for Sanctions, asking the Court
(and

000392).

law of the case.

for deleted electronic ﬁles. A11

given that

p.

did not produce any additional documents, and instead stated that

the records that

R., p.

000391); and

should otherwise be denied (see R.,

have an electronic record keeping system in place
Further,

(R., p.

never appealed the District Court’s decision, and UCI’S successor

Thereafter,

9.

UCI

000391);

Settlement Agreement (see R., p. 000391).

Summary Judgment

liability

Gem State-Boise (R., p.

a.

UCI and Gem

Gem

State-Boise

Gem State incurred 0n the discovery

On June

10.

Motion

24, 2019, following hearing, the District Court granted

for Sanctions, but refused t0 order the relief

Court required

UCI to

turn over

email accounts to a third party

subpoenas (also

at

all

Gem

State requested. Instead, the District

of its computers and other electronic devices and access t0

Gem State’s cost),

(at

Gem State’s

and further authorized

Gem State’s cost) t0 UCI’S third-party Email

Gem State t0 issue

Service Providers. R., pp.

000470-472.1
11.

emails, and

Gem State did go on to hire a third party t0 access and produce all 0f UCI’S
n0 responsive emails were uncovered — apparently, UCI had,

responsive emails.

Gem State

also issued subpoenas t0

in fact, deleted

UCI’S email providers

(AOL and

Google), but those providers refused to produce responsive information. R., pp. 000767-772.
12.

As

the

trial

drew

near, the Parties

were able

t0 agree

0n

Virtually every fact (R.,

pp. 000619-623) and nearly every exhibit, leaving for trial only the following questions:

Was Gem

a.

State

damaged by UCI’S breach 0f the TSA?

(R., pp.

000550,

000632)

What remedies

b.

is

Gem State entitled t0 for UCI’S breach of the TSA?

(R., p.

000550, 000632)

Did UCI

c.

The

Gem State’s trademark rights?

(R., p.

13.

A one-day Court trial was held on August 5, 2019. R., p.

14.

On

September

Conclusions 0f Law and

1

infringe

District

Court

later

its

17,

2019, the District Court issued

its

000550, 000632)

000626.

Findings of Fact

&

Judgment, which are the subject 0f this appeal. R., pp. 000624-648.

modiﬁed

the Order, pursuant to

UCI’s Motion to Reconsider and Motion

Order, to exclude the production of attorney-client communications. R., p. 000547.

for Protective

15.

On

the grounds that

it

September

was

19,

2019,

UCI moved

for an

award 0f attorneys’

fees

and

costs,

on

the prevailing party, notwithstanding the District Court’s ﬁnding that

neither party prevailed. R., p. 000649.

16.

costs based

granting

costs

On

September 24, 2019,

0n the entry of the Order granting

and fees following

trial.

On December

and Costs, denying the

C.

fees

and

Gem State’s Motion t0 Compel and the Order

Gem State’s Motion for Sanctions, both of which orders provided for a determination of

17.

Both

Gem State moved for an award 0f attorneys’

R., pp.

13,

000692-699.

2019, the District Court entered

Parties’ cross

its

Order Re: Attorney Fees

motions for attorneys’ fees and

costs. R., pp.

000818—829.

parties appeal that ruling.

Statement 0f Facts

The following

facts are

undisputed because

evidenced bV stipulated-to exhibits, or

(iii)

are the

(i)

they were stipulated

law 0f the case pursuant

to,

or

(ii)

they are

t0 the District Court’s

un—appealed summary iudgment decision:
1.

In 1995, Jeff Flynn and Michelle Flynn, acting as directors, created Flynn, Inc.

and ﬁled Articles of Incorporation for Flynn,

Inc.

with the Idaho Secretary of State. R.,

p.

000626.
2.

In

August 1997, Rick

Silvia ﬁled a Certiﬁcate

the Idaho Secretary 0f State, indicating that he

p.000626.

of Assumed Business

was doing business

as

“Gem

State

Name With

Rooﬁng.”

R.,

In 1998, Jeff Flynn, President, and Michelle Flynn, Secretary, ﬁled Articles 0f

3.

Amendment 0f Flynn,

Inc.

With the Idaho Secretary of State changing the

Gem State Rooﬁng & Asphalt Maintenance,

Inc. (referred t0 herein as

name of Flynn,

“Gem

Inc. to

State-Boise”). R.,

p.000627.
In 1999, Michelle Flynn, Secretary, ﬁled a Certiﬁcate of Assumed Business

4.

With the Idaho Secretary of State indicating that
State

Rooﬁng.

the

Gem State-Boise was doing business as Gem

000627.

In 2000, Rick Silvia ﬁled Articles 0f Incorporation for Plaintiff,

5.

Rooﬁng,

R., p.

Name

Inc. (referred t0 herein as

“Gem

Gem State

State”) R., p. 000627.

6.

Gem State primarily does business in Blaine County,

T

(hmSmwmmmmmmmﬂymmmawbmm6MnmmmCWmWmexmmm

name “Gem

Rooﬁng”

since

it

was formed

in 2000. R., p.

Gem State-Boise did not present evidence of its use

8.

Rooﬁng”

State

in Blaine

County prior to

In October 2005,

9.

000628. The
a.

TSA provides

Gem State

of the mark

“Gem

State

2002.

and

Gem State and Gem State-Boise
p.

Gem State-Boise executed the TSA.

R., p.

agreed that their names are confusingly similar to

000628.

Gem State and Gem State-Boise
000628.

000622.

as follows:

each other. R.,
b.

May 26,

Idaho. R., p. 000627.

agreed that they provide similar services. R.,

p.

c.

Gem State and Gem State-Boise
as t0 source, origin,

d.

Gem State-Boise
County.” R.,

e.

p.

(i)

agreed that

it

would not

Idaho that

agreed

it

000622.

advertise 0r solicit business in Blaine

would “not perform any

is

listed in

paragraph

put out for bid

Gem State-Boise

3(a),

requesting the

agreed that

work

t0

and

among qualiﬁed
if

it

services in Blaine

Gem State.

Defendant, operating under the

(ii)

work

County

TSA,

R., p.

for a public entity in

contractors.” R., p. 000629.

received a request for

prohibited from performing under the

10.

services. R., p.

warranty and maintenance work and repeat customer business for the

former customers

f.

and sponsorship 0f their respective

000628.

Gem State-Boise
except

agreed that there was a likelihood 0f confusion

it

would

work

that

it

was

direct the person 0r entity

000629.

name Gem

State

Rooﬁng, has bid 0n and

performed work in Blaine County, in breach 0f the TSA. R., pp. 000629-630.
11.

rooﬁng work

In September 2010,

t0 Brashears

12.

In 201

13.

The

Gem State-Boise.
14.

State

1,

submitted a bid for $18,840.00 worth of

& Sons, in breach of the TSA. R., pp. 000629-630, 688.

Jeff Flynn created Defendant UCI. R., p. 000623.

creation of UCI occurred at approximately the

R., p.

R., p.

same time

as the dissolution of

000371.

Defendant

Rooﬁng.”

Gem State-Boise

UCI has,

000623.

since

its

creation,

conducted business under the name

“Gem

15.

the

TSA.

Gem State-Boise and UCI have performed work in Blaine County,

R., pp.

16.

County work
17.

rooﬁng work
18.

Gem State.

In June 201

to

of

000386, 000631.

At no time did UCI
t0

in Violation

R., p.

1,

(or

its

predecessor,

Gem State-Boise)

000386.

Gem

State-Boise or

UCI

submitted a bid for $10,500.00 worth 0f

Larry Isham, in breach of the TSA. R.,

On October

13,

ever refer any Blaine

201

1,

p.

000688.

Shay Construction paid

Gem State-Boise 0r UCI

$17,424.00 for rooﬁng work done in Blaine County, in breach 0f the TSA. R.,

p.

000688;

Stipulated Trial Exhibitz 12.

19.

On August

17,

2017,

UCI

submitted a $54,000.00 bid t0

Snow Mountain

Apartments for a Blaine County rooﬁng project, in breach 0f the TSA. R.,

p.

000688;

Stip.

EXh.

21.

20.

On August 22,

2016, Pioneer West Property Management paid Defendant

$1,950.00 for rooﬁng work done in breach of the TSA. R.,
21.

asphalt

On August 25,

On February

15,

in Blaine

2017,

UCI

County

Stip.

EXh.

19.

in breach

0f the TSA. R.,

p.

000623.

submitted an $84,950.00 bid to ESI Construction for

a Blaine County rooﬁng project, in breach 0f the

2

000688;

2016, Standard Plumbing Supply paid Defendant $2,48 1 .00 for

work performed 0n property
22.

p.

TSA.

R., p.

000688;

Stip.

References to “Stipulated Trial Exhibits” shall be abbreviated to “Stip. EXh.” herein.

EXh. 24.

On January 22,

23.

on a property

in Blaine

County rooﬁng

River Valley’s

project, in breach

new animal

breach 0f the TSA. R.,

000630.
26.

Stip.

UCI

breach 0f the TSA. R.,

p.

000623;

Stip.

EXh. 26.

submitted a $13,600.00 bid to Bruce Bothwell for a Blaine

of the TSA. R.,

p.

000688.

Stip.

EXh. 29.

p.

000623.

Wood

(“Animal Shelter project”), located in Blaine County, in

shelter

UCI has been paid

at least

$279,540.00 for the Animal Shelter.

Exh. 42.

UCI used Gem

contracting with

3

2018,

in

Defendant accepted a rooﬁng project worth more than $200,000.00 for the

25.

R., p.

County done

On May 25,

24.

2018, Kerry Armstrong paid Defendant $750.00 for rooﬁng work

name — “Gem

State’s exact

McAlvain Construction 0n

the

Rooﬁng,

State

Animal Shelter

Inc.”

— when

Proj ect. R., p. 000135; Stip. Exh.

1.

27.

Documents produced pursuant

Construction, the contractor for the

The following
28.

facts

“Gem

State

were not

104A; Trial

Tr., pp.

p.

stipulated t0, but

Gem State-Boise and UCI’S

132:25

—

Shelter,

Rooﬁng” name

0f the project. R.,

000161;

-10-

that

UCI’S

Stip.

EXh. 36.
at trial:

and performance of rooﬁng jobs

Gem State,

133224.

show

created actual confusion as t0

were presented

solicitation

County, along with the failure t0 refer such jobs to
Trial Exhibit

subpoena from McAlvain

Wood River Valley Animal

operations in Blaine County under the

Gem State’s source 0r sponsorship

t0 a third-party

caused

Gem

in Blaine

State t0 lose proﬁts.

29.

As

the Parties agreed in the

TSA,

Gem State has a common law trademark in

GEM STATE ROOFING in Blaine County, Idaho. R., pp.

000236-241; see also Trial

Tr., pp.

181:24 — 182212.
30.

As

the Parties agreed in the

TSA,

Gem State’s trademark rights

STATE ROOFING mark are prior in right to both Gem
in Blaine County, R., pp.

The following
that are the subject

3

1.

documents
33.

facts

were not

State-Boise’s and UCI’S trademark rights

at issue at trial,

but are relevant t0 the discovery sanctions

of this appeal:

In September 2018,

In October and

in response t0

In

GEM

000236-241.

Gem State initiated discovery by propounding several written

discovery requests 0n UCI. R., pp. 000066
32.

in the

— 000073.

November 2018, UCI produced

a sum-total 0f

Gem State’s written discovery requests.

November and December 2018, Gem

R., p.

1

17 pages 0f

000099.

State served eleven (1 1) third-party

Subpoenas Duces Tecum upon some 0f Defendant’s potential and existing customers

in Blaine

County. In response, those third parties produced hundreds 0f pages 0f documents, including

numerous emails and contracts

that

had not been produced by UCI, even though UCI had been a

party to those emails and contracts. R., pp. 000058-59.

34.

On December 20,

2018,

Gem

State

deposed Jeff Flynn, the President 0f UCI.

pp. 000105-1 19. Mr. Flynn’s deposition testimony and the
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documents obtained from

R.,

third parties

conﬁrm that many 0f UCI’S discovery responses

are

still

insufﬁcient. R., pp. 000105-1 193;

000122-165; 000168-1724.

On January 28,

35.

about March

4,

2019,

Gem State ﬁled its Motion to Compel.

Defendant’s

000362. That

p.

total

last,

its

most

third supplemental response t0

On or

had ﬁled

its

Motion

2019. R.,

p.

000367.

to

17, 2019,

and

90%

of

Gem State had expended signiﬁcant money t0

Gem State had taken depositions,

Compel. The hearing 0n

On April

Gem State’s ﬁrst set

substantial production (representing

production) occurred only after

obtain documents from third parties, after

36.

000367.

2019, just two weeks before the hearing on that motion, Defendant produced

1,031 pages (Bates Nos. 001 18-1 148) in

of requests. R.,

R., p.

that

Motion

t0

and

after

Gem State

Compel was held on March

in response t0 the District Court’s

Order

t0

19,

Compel,

Defendants provided supplemental discovery responses, but no additional documents, stating
instead:

UCI

does not have an electronic record keeping system in place to

maintain electronic communications (emails) With vendors,
suppliers, customers,

and

UCI conducted a diligent search
may have existed related t0 Blaine

clients.

electronic records that

any
County projects, but no additional documents exist that have not
already been produced 0r obtained through subpoena.
for

3

See speciﬁcally the following pages and lines 0f the deposition transcript: p. 111, L. 24 through p. 112, L.
24 through p. 120, L. 16; p. 132, L. 8-11; p. 135, L. 6-17; p. 136, L. 2-4 0fthe deposition transcript.

9; p.

119, L.

4
R. pp. 000122-165 and 000168-172 are documents that were not produced by UCI initially; instead, they were
produced by third parties in response t0 subpoenas served by Gem State. Jeffrey Flynn was asked about those
documents at deposition, as set forth in R. pp. 000105-1 19, and he veriﬁed their authenticity. Those documents were
subsequently produced by UCI after Gem State’s Motion to Compel was ﬁled, just days prior to the hearing on that
Motion.
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R., p.

000458.

UCI

37.

maintain or keep

“UCI

also tacitly admitted t0 deleting otherwise responsive emails:

many of the

records that were provided through subpoena, and

did not

UCI does

not

have a method ofrecoveryfor deleted electronicﬁles. A11 documents that could be recovered

have

now been produced
The

38.

operation

(emphasis added). R.,

p.

000458.

assertion that, in 2019, a commercial enterprise With a statewide business

would have no email records

Sanctions 0n
R., pp.

...”

May 30,

is

hardly credible.

Gem State ﬁled a Motion t0 for

2019, which the Court granted in a sweeping Order, dated June 24, 2019.

000470—471. The Court ordered Defendant

t0

“make

available t0 Plaintiff

purpose 0f allowing Plaintiff t0 inspect, copy 0r make mirror image copies

communication data stored 0r accesses

[sic]

of,

.

.

.

for the

any and

all

by any 0f defendant’s personal 0r business-related

electronic devices capable of creating 0r receiving electronic mail 0r text messages.” R., p.

000470. The District Court further authorized

Gem State t0:

“issue third party subpoenas t0

relevant Email Service Providers (ESP), 0r Internet Service Providers (ISP) as needed.”5 R., p.

00047 1

.

Gem State promptly issued subpoenas to the AOL and Gmail

39.

that

UCI used,

third parties

5

The

District

as well as to Verizon, the mobile carrier

R., pp.

0005 1 8-523. Those

responded as follows:

Court modiﬁed

its

Order on July 11 by directing

Gem State to “amend its

AOL to clearly identify that only deleted emails are being sought,
shall

UCI used.

service providers

be delivered to the Court, not Plaintiff or

Plaintiff’s

and

Counsel.” R.,

-13-

subpoenas to Google and
documents sought under the subpoenas
p. 000545

all

a.

Verizon responded 0n July

2019

17,

that

“The name and telephone number

provided does not match the Verizon Wireless account holder.”

Gem State

sent a

revised subpoena t0 Verizon 0n July 17, 2019, t0 which Verizon never responded.

R., p.

b.

000762.

On July 30,
Via

letter,

would be
deleted

c.

Google,

2019, Oath,

which

stated

illegal t0

it

Inc.,

d0 so.” In any event,

Who manages

the

t0 the

it

it

“does not archive 0r keep records 0f

.000767-768.

Gmail service UCI used, did not respond prior

2019, following

Google obj ected

AOL email servers, responded

“will not provide content in response t0 a subpoena as

AOL email.” R., pp

On August 27,

Which manages the

trial,

Google responded With a

letter in

to trial.

which

subpoena and refused t0 produce any responsive

documents. R., pp. 000770-772.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED
The
1.

issues

Did the

0n appeal

ON APPEAL

are:

District Court’s decision t0 not grant injunctive relief t0

Gem State

for

UCI’S

contract breach, thereby nullifying the non-compete agreement, constitute an abuse of

discretion?

2.

Did

the District Court err in

discontinued, and

3.

(ii)

0n

(i)

ﬁnding

that the injury-causing behavior has

been

that basis, refusing t0 enter injunctive relief?

Should the Court enjoin “minimal” contract-breaching, injury-causing behavior?
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4. Is

Gem State’s relative proﬁt margin irrelevant t0 the question 0f whether Gem State

has 10st proﬁts?

5. Is

UCI’S Violation 0f the contractual obligation

evidence that

Gem State

“would have gotten the

.

.

.

wor

to refer

”

work

t0 justify

t0

Gem State

sufﬁcient

an award 0f damages to

Gem State?
6.

Can

Gem State prove a right to money damages without producing the testimony of

customers allegedly lost as a result 0f UCI’S wrongful conduct?
7.

Are money damages recoverable from “minimal,” contract-breaching, injury—causing

behavior?

8. Is

Gem State entitled t0 recover damages,

and proﬁts would have been had
9. Is

UCI

estopped from challenging

Did the

District

Court

the Blaine

the cost

Gem State’s

its

costs

claim t0 a protectable

common law

under Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) in denying

fees

and costs?

Should the District Court have sanctioned

relatively light

cannot prove What

GEM STATE ROOFING mark?

err

Gem State’s request for attorneys’
11.

it

UCI not breached the non-compete agreement?

trademark in Blaine County for the
10.

even though

UCI

for discovery Violations

and efﬁcient sanction of making an inference

that

Gem State would have obtained

County work that UCI wrongfully obtained, instead of requiring

and time 0f copying UCI’s email accounts and issuing subpoenas

deleted emails?
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by the

Gem State to incur

t0 third parties for

12.

Did the

District

Court

err

Gem State’s request for attorneys’
13.

Did the

District

Court

fees

err

Gem State’s request for attorneys’

under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C) in denying

and costs?

under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(2) in denying

fees

and costs incurred 0n proving matters

have admitted — and ultimately stipulated
14.

UCI

should

t0 at trial?

Gem State is claiming attorney fees on appeal,

speciﬁcally provides that “If any litigation 0r proceeding

on the basis of the TSA, Which

is

commenced between

parties or their representatives arising out of, 0r relating t0, this

limitation, a breach

that

0r

among

the

Agreement, including, Without

of any covenant, condition, representation, warranty, agreement, or provision

of this Agreement, the prevailing party
granted, to have and recover

shall

be

entitled, in addition to

from the other party reasonable

such other relief as

attorneys' fees

and

all

may be

costs 0f such

action.”

III.

ARGUMENT
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
There are

at least three different standards

t0

Gem State’s

is

a matter resting largely in the

appeal 0f the denial 0f injunctive

0f review that apply t0

relief:

trial court's discretion.

be reversed 0n appeal unless clear abuse

is

“The granting or refusal of an injunction

The exercise 0f such

shown.” Conley

(Idaho 1999) (internal citations omitted).
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Gem State’s appeal. As

v.

Whittlesey,

discretion Will not

985 P.2d 1127, 1135

As
damages
Will not

Inc.

v.

t0

Gem State’s appeal 0f the denial 0f money damages:

reviewed for clear

is

be

set aside

error.

when based on

The ﬁndings 0f the
substantial

trial

“The decision

t0 not

award

court on the question 0f damages

and competent evidence.” Trilogy Network Sys.,

Johnson, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (Idaho 2007) (internal citations omitted).

As

t0

Gem State’s appeal 0f the District Court’s discovery orders and refusal t0 award

attorneys’ fees in favor 0f

Gem State:

[C]ontr01 of discovery
court.

.

.

.

is

Accordingly, a

an area Within the discretion 0f the
trial court's

trial

decision t0 grant or deny a

motion to compel will only be reversed When there has been a clear
abuse of discretion. To determine whether a trial court abused its
discretion, this Court examines: (1) whether the trial court
correctly perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) whether the
trial court acted Within the outer boundaries 0f its discretion and
consistently With the legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc

and (3) whether the
decision by an exercise 0f reason.
choices available t0

Quigley

v.

Kemp, 398 P.3d

it;

trial

court reached

its

and quotation marks

141, 143 (Idaho 2017) (internal citations

omitted).

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR IN FAILING TO

AWARD INJUNCTIVE RELIEF OR DAMAGES.
The

District Court’s

fundamental error was

its

misapplication of the law as concerning

damages. The District Court failed to answer the question: “did
likely than not suffered

damage?”

Gem State prove that it

Instead, the District Court focused

on the

fact that

M

Gem State

could not prove the precise amount 0f damages, and then, working backward, interpreted that t0

mean that Gem
error

State

by following

was not

this

entitled to

damages

at all.

The

District

Court could have avoided

Court’s decision in Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
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v.

MRI

Assam, LLP, 334 P.3d 780
to so

much

Alphonsus,

as cte to that

this

Court

(Idaho 2014), Which should control here, yet the District Court failed

2014 decision, despite

Gem State’s repeated citations t0

set forth the standard the District

it.

In Saint

Court should have applied in

this

non-

compete/lost proﬁts case:

The measure of damages

for loss of proﬁts is rarely susceptible 0f

accurate proof. Therefore, the law does not require accurate proof

With any degree of mathematical certainty. Any claim of damages
for prospective loss contains an element of uncertainty, but that
fact is not fatal t0 recovery.

risk

The most elementary conceptions 0f
that the wrongdoer shall bear the
own wrong has created. The party

and public policy require
0f the uncertainty which his

justice

seeking t0 recover lost proﬁts

is

not required t0 obtain the

testimony 0f the customers allegedly lost as a result 0f the
wrongdoer's conduct. There only need be sufﬁcient evidence in the
record t0 allow the jury t0 conclude that the inference linking the
wrongdoer's conduct t0 the claimant's damages is more probable

than the inference connecting such loss to other factors. Factors
that the jury

may consider include the

Claimant's proﬁts for a

reasonable period prior to the breach 0f the covenant not t0

show that, by depression
would have been less, the relationship
between the increase in proﬁts by the party breaching the covenant
and the losses sustained by the claimant during the period of the
compete, leaving

it

for the other party to

in trade 0r other causes, they

breach, and

334 P.3d

at

790 (internal

all

of the surrounding facts and Circumstances.

citations

and quotations marks

omitted).

The

District

Court did not

follow this Court’s guidance t0 focus 0n UCI’S wrongful conduct; instead, the District Court

focused 0n the uncertainty in the amount of damages (Which uncertainty was created by UCI),

found

Gem State wanting,

and refused

to order injunctive relief or
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money damages.

1.

The

District

Court Committed a Clear Abuse 0f Discretion

in

Denying

Gem State Injunctive Relief.
The standard
is

sought

is

0f injunctive relief is a showing that the party against

for entry

Violating, 0r threatens t0 Violate,

some

right 0f the party seeking the

whom relief

remedy.”

Conley, 985 P.2d at 1135 (internal citation omitted). “For a permanent injunction t0 issue, the
plaintiff must prevail

appropriate in

all

on the merits of his or her claim and

other respects.” 42

generally seen as discretionary, there
injunctive relief as a matter of right

material, substantial,

remedy

at

law.” 42

Am.
is

Jur.

clear

and irreparable injury

Am.

Jur.

2d Injunctions

authority for the

0n a

2d Injunctions

should issue only where irreparable injury

establish that equitable relief is

showing

View

that a complainant is entitled t0

that the acts

t0 the complainant for

§ 14.

is

As

“Although injunctions are

§ 11.

this

Which there

is

n0 adequate

Court has explained: “injunctions

actually threatened.”

Loan ASS ’n ofBoise, 739 P.2d 301, 306 (Idaho

complained 0f cause a

0 ’Boskey v.

First Fed. Sav.

&

1987).

Generally, courts should award injunctive relief where (1) the plaintiff has prevailed on
the merits, (2) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief, (3)

the

harm

to the plaintiff would

the injunction

outweigh the harm to the defendants from an injunction, and (4)

would not adversely

12 (lst Cir. 2013). See also

affect the public interest.

0 ’Boskey,

Where the aggrieved party Will

739

at

306 (ﬁnding

Joyce

v.

Town ofDennis, 720 F.3d

that injunctive relief is appropriate

suffer irreparable injury if the complained-of conduct

stopped); I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1), (2) and (3).
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is

not

These principles are summarized in the preliminary injunction standard in Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure 65(6),

Which provides

for the entering 0f injunctive relief upon

any 0f the

following cases:

(1)

when

it

appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled t0
and that relief, or any part 0f it, consists 0f

the relief demanded,
restraining the
of, either for

when

commission or continuance 0f the

acts

complained

a limited period 0r perpetually;

appears by the complaint or afﬁdavit that the
commission 0r continuance 0f some act during the litigation would
(2)

it

produce waste, 0r great or irreparable injury to the
(3)

When

it

appears during the litigation that the defendant

threatening, procuring 0r allowing t0 be done, or

some

plaintiff;

0f the

act in Violation

0f the action, and the action

is

is

doing,

about t0 do,

plaintiff’s rights, respecting the subject

may make

the requested judgment

ineffectual[.]

Gem State
-

satisﬁed each 0f the foregoing requirements:

Gem State proved that UCI had breached (R.,

continue to breach, the
-

lasting

The

loss

and even

TSA, namely working

of business

fatal t0

may not be

Gem State.

in Blaine

at p.

000386), and unless enj oined would

County

in Violation

immediately apparent, but

UCI’S future breach 0f the

UCI was

effects

may be

long

TSA may also result in lost

proﬁts, Which, as this case demonstrates, are difﬁcult to calculate

learning about what jobs

its

of the TSA;

—

Gem State was not even

misappropriating and so had no opportunity to bid on those

projects. (R., at p. 000386);

-

(R., at p.

UCI was working

in Blaine

County

in Violation

000386).

Moreover:
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of Gem State’s rights under the TSA.

-

An injunction ordering UCI to

freely entered

— would not be

abide

unfair t0 0r

by the

TSA — that UCI’S predecessor had already

damage UCI, but not

entering the injunction, and thus

opening the door wide t0 UCI’S continued Violation 0f the TSA, would leave

Gem

State

defenseless and Without recourse;
-

Gem State

showed

that the public

would not be damaged by ordering UCI

to

comply

With the TSA, and in fact the public would be aided because they would not be confused
regarding the nature 0f the relationship between the competing

Gem State Rooﬁng companies

(Trial Tr., p. 133, L. 6-22; p. 174, L. 1-12).

Still,

the District Court refused t0 enter relief because:

The District Courtfound
State

would have gotten thejobs

District Court’s

ﬁnding here

County work

Gem State:

to

performing under

this

is

in contravention

Gem State R.
it is

far

more

UCI bid

at p.

State ’s evidence insuﬁicient t0 support

that

UCI bid 0n andperformed (see

ﬂawed

in that the

Agreement,

UCI

it

aﬁnding that Gem

R. at p. 000634). The

TSA expressly required UCI t0 refer Blaine

“If either party receives a request for

other party.” R. at p. 0003 14.

work

Gem

work that

it is

prohibited from

will direct the person or entity requesting the

did not breach the

work

to the

TSA merely by soliciting and performing

of it, but also in failing t0 refer those customers and potential customers t0

000386, 634.

likely that

Had UCI complied with

its

contractual obligation to refer work,

Gem State would have obtained some

of the Blaine County work that

0n.

The

referral provision

of the

TSA was

to continue t0 operate (in different locations)

critically-important because the parties

under the exact same name —
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were going

Gem State Rooﬁng.

So, if a Blaine

bid,

it

County customer

would be unreasonable

solicited a bid

for that

from

“Gem

Rooﬁng,” and UCI came out

State

same customer t0 contact “Gem

make

State-Blaine) a second time (in the customer’s mind) to

— bidding 0n Blaine County work and not referring
even more difﬁcult t0 determine Whether

the

work

State

Rooﬁng” (Gem

a second bid. UCI’s double-breach

t0

Gem State-Blaine — makes

it

Gem State-Blaine was damaged: Gem State-Blaine was
—

not even learning about the jobs and never had an opportunity to bid them. That uncertainty

would

Gem State-Blaine have been able t0

As

secure

work

it

never

knew was

out there?

— must be

Gem State, because UCI created the uncertainty by not referring

held against UCI, not against
the work, as required.

t0

this

Court has held: “Any claim 0f damages for prospective loss

contains an element of uncertainty, but that fact

is

not fatal t0 recovery. The most elementary

conceptions ofjustice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk 0f the
uncertainty which his

added).

What the

by UCI’S breach

UCI

own wrong has

District

created.” Saint Alphonsus,

Court did here was exactly opposite:

t0 serve as a shield t0

UCI. Under the

can confuse customers into thinking

it is

about a job and get an opportunity t0 bid on
Will be for

Gem State to prove its losses

at

790 (emphasis

allowed the uncertainty created

District Court’s decision, the

Gem State,

it;

it

334 P.3d

the less likely

and the more

more

Gem State is t0 learn

that happens, the

and the more likely UCI will be

to

more

difﬁcult

pay no cost

duplicitous behavior. Put another way, the District Court’s decision gets the incentives

the

more harm,

get

away With

the

it.

more uncertainty a Defendant can

Add t0

that

inﬂict, the

harm and uncertainty UCI’S
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more

that

likely the

for

all

its

wrong:

Defendant

steadfast refusal t0 participate in

it

is t0

discovery (see below), and you end up With a situation where

prove

its

it is

impossible for

Gem State to

damages. The District Court’s ruling here almost perfectly insulates the wrongdoer.

Gem

The District Court also penalized
customers allegedly

lost

Stateforfailing t0 produce the testimony 0f

as a result ofDefendant’s wrongful conduct: “there

is

n0 evidence 0r

Gem

testimony from any 0f these clients (potential 0r otherwise) that they would have hired
State Blaine

is

had UCI referred these

clients t0

Gem State Blaine.” R.

directly contrary t0 this Court’s statement that

“The party seeking

at p.

000634. That decision

t0 recover lost proﬁts is not

required to obtain the testimony 0f the customers allegedly lost as a result 0f the wrongdoer's

conduct.” SaintAlphonsus, 334 P.3d at 790.

The District Court seemed toﬁnd,
behavior had resolved
recently (other than

itself:

“there

0n the animal

—

at

nearly $300,000,

it

When considering whether UCI’S

shelter,

State

is

t0 support

would have

this

simply unknown Whether

whether in

fact

UCI

ﬁnding:

10st

conduct damaged

because

(ii)

(i)

UCI

p.

the animal shelter proj ect

not an

and

is

most damaging Violation of the TSA.

Gem State, that is the proj ect that should be

project

UCI testiﬁed — Without providing
is

largely irrelevant to whether

withheld production

proj ect;

0f,

in Blaine County, just as

(iv)

Gem

and deleted, documents,
it is

it

unknown

most importantly, the decision

that

would not be enjoined and damages would not be awarded
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000634.

has sustained a 1055).” R., at

the fact that

UCI had other projects

money 0n the

contract-breaching behavior

it

UCI has done work in Blaine County

represents the largest and

— that UCI lost money on the

lost proﬁt; (iii)

that

upon which

focused 0n, not dismissed as an aberration;

documents

absence ofevidence, that the injury-causing

was n0 evidence

There are four immediate problems With
exception

in the

UCI’S

Virtually

assures that UCI’S contract-breaching activity will continue: if UCI can conduct business in
Violation 0f the

TSA, and pay n0 penalty

With discovery rules — there

warned against

no reason

for

UCI to

abide

— even avoid the

cost 0f complying

by the TSA. This Court has expressly

outcome:

this

It is

is

for the Violation

the duty of the courts to

beware 0f efforts

to defeat injunctive

0f repentence and reform, especially when

relief by protestations

abandonment seems timed to

anticipate suit,

and there

is

probability 0f resumption.

0 ’Boskey,
relief

739 P.2d

0n the basis

at

that

306.

It

but

it

”
R., at p.

error for the District Court to

UCI’S contract-breaching

Relatedly, the District

“minimal.

was thus

Courtfound

000634. Not only

is

deny

Gem State injunctive

activity has not occurred “recently.”

that UCI’S contract—breaching behavior

that

ﬁnding irrelevant

of injunctive

t0 the entry

factually wrong. First, the District Court cited t0 only four (4) instances

performed work

in Violation

of the

four (4) other instances Where

Which were

UCI

also Violations 0f the

TSA (R.,

m

at pp.

was
relief,

where UCI

000629-630); the District Court also noted

(but did not perform work)

TSA, but seemed

on Blaine County

t0 dismiss that behavior

because

proj ects,

UCI

“did

not win those bids and consequently did not receive any income 0r proﬁt as a result of those
bids” (R., at p. 00063 1).

What the

Mg, even Where UCI
not referring the

work to

did not

District

Win

Gem State,

Court missed in

the contract,

as the

is

its

analysis

a Violation of the

TSA required (see R.

deprived 0f the opportunity to get the work, and

(iii)
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at p.

whether 0r not

was

that

TSA,

(ii)

0003 14)

UCI

(i)

the very act 0f

by bidding and

Gem State was

earned income 0r proﬁt

is

not relevant to Whether

Gem State lost proﬁt.

The

legally relevant question

is

whether

Gem

State lost proﬁt.

Moreover, by even the District Court’s "only-four-instances-of—breach" count, those jobs

were worth nearly $300,000.00

rooﬁng business

in Blaine County,

UCI was breaching the TSA,
104A)

is,

in revenue. R., at pp. 000629-630).

manifestly,

Whose gross revenue

That amount, for a small

in the years

2010 through 2014 When

never even reached $300,000 in a single year (see Trial Exhibit

more than “minimal.”

There are even more fundamental problems With the District Court’s “recency,” and

“minimal” ﬁndings.
District

First, if

District Court’s decision

t0 so

both minimal and self—remedied, as the

TSA anyway — would work n0 hardship 0n UCI.

had the

effect

0f nullifying the TSA, or

UCI t0 work in Blaine County Without penalty. The

at least

District

modify the TSA: “[C]0urts d0 not possess the roving power

make them more
v.

is

Court believes, the entry of injunctive relief prayed for — Which would d0 nothing more

than enforce the terms of the

allow

indeed UCI’s conduct

equitable.” Losee

v.

Secondly, the

modifying

s0 as t0

it

Court did not have authority

t0 rewrite contracts in order t0

Idaho C0., 220 P.3d 575, 579 (Idaho 2009); see also Page

Pasquali, 244 P.3d 1236, 1238 (Idaho 2010) (quoting Elliott

v.

Darwin Neibaur Farms, 69

P.3d 1035, 1040 (Idaho 2003) (“courts cannot revise the contract in order t0 change or make a
better

agreement for the parties”); Lupis

v.

Peoples Mortg. C0., 690 P.2d 944, 947 (Idaho Ct.

App. 1984) (“Absent fraud 0r overreaching — neither 0f which has been shown here —

modify the express terms of a contract upon which competent
Simplot C0.

v.

Chambers, 350 P.2d 21

1,

parties

have agreed”);

214 (1960) (“Courts cannot make for the

-25-

we

cannot

J.R.

parties better

agreements than they themselves have been satisﬁed to make, and by a process 0f interpretation

one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented

relieve

interpret

an agreement

t0

mean something

t0;

nor can courts

the contract does not itself contain”).

By effectively

excusing UCI’S conduct as “minimal” and not “recent,” the District Court interpreted the

mean

that if a breach is “minimal,” 0r

that the

remote in time,

it is

no breach

at all

— which

TSA to

something

is

TSA does not say.
2.

The

District

Court Committed Clear Error

in Refusing to

Award

Damages.
Under Idaho law, damages from
determined by showing:
gains. Saint Alphonsus,

(i)

the Violation 0f a non-competition agreement

the plaintiff’s lost proﬁts,

334 P.3d

degree 0f mathematical certainty.

at 790.

Id.

;

damages does not mean
Drilling Corp,

2010).

Id.

Once

that

62 (Idaho

if

it

Ct.

The

the defendant’s corresponding

require proof of damages with any

Valley Truck Brokers, Inc.

may be

v.

Meyer, 982 P.2d 945,

difﬁcult to arrive at an exact

damages may not be awarded. Timberline Drilling,

damages has been

The proﬁts Which a defendant

evidence

it

(ii)

CV 09-18-N—EJL-MHW, 2010 WL

LLC, No.

the right to

The law does not

Magic

951 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999). The fact that

and

established,

may be

it is

11531293,

at

amount of
Inc.

corresponds, in whole 0r in part, t0 plaintiff’s loss.

Dunn

may be
v.

Am.

*7 (D. Idaho Mar. 17,

for the trier-of—fact to

realized in Violation 0f an agreement

v.

ﬁx

the amount.

considered in

Ward, 670 P.2d 59, 61-

App. 1983).

District Court’s decision t0

these principles of law, as

more

deny

Gem State an award 0f damages was

contrary t0

ﬁllly set forth below; but perhaps the District Court’s
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most

glaring error lies in

its

ﬁxation 0n

irrelevant t0 the question

Gem State’s relative proﬁt margin — a fact that is completely

0f lost proﬁts.

Still,

the District Court returned to this (irrelevant) fact

again and again:
-

“[T]he exhibit prepared by Silvia setting forth his gross revenue, proﬁt, and proﬁt

margin shows that his proﬁt margin has increased overall

in 18 years. In fact, in

2018, he had the highest proﬁt margin ever for his business
-

“Gem

State Blaine has not demonstrated that

UCI’S conduct.

it

“Gem

Instead, the evidence demonstrates that

State Blaine experienced

its

R. at p. 00063 1.

has suffered irreparable injury by

margin has overall been increasing for the past 18 years
-

...”

Gem State Blaine’s proﬁt
...”

R. at p. 000633.

highest proﬁt margin just last year

...”

R. at p.

000634.
-

“While

Gem State Blaine’s business did take a downturn during the recession,

since recovered and has

had

its

it

has

highest proﬁt margin t0 date in 20 1 8.” R. at p.

000638.

The

error here is both legal

and

State lost proﬁts, not Whether

case that

it

factual. Legally, the question

10st proﬁt

Gem State can identify,

margin. There

is

on damages concerns whether

n0 case

cited

Gem

by the Court, and n0

that stands for the proposition that declining proﬁt

margin

is

a

measure 0f recovery. The reason the law does not require a showing ofproﬁt margin reveals the
District Court’s factual error:

may be utterly unrelated to
retailer,

may have

proﬁt margin

proﬁt margin.

is

simply n0 proxy for

lost proﬁt. Indeed, total

proﬁts

A historically low-margin company, such as grocery

increasing proﬁts even as

its

proﬁt margin shrinks during expansion;
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may have record margins 0n

conversely, a traditionally high-margin company, such as a jeweler,

diminishing sales. So here: the fact that

Gem State was losing proﬁts, due in part t0 UCI’S

contract-breaching conduct, meant that

Gem State was cutting costs t0 stay alive.

cutting measures increased margin, even as total proﬁts

— which

is

Those

cost-

the legal measure 0f its

damages — declined.

The

on “proﬁt margin” underscores the fundamental problem: the

Court never answered the legally relevant questions:

District

(ii)

District Court’s focus

if s0, is

it

more

(i)

by UCI’S

may be used in answering the secondary

assuming the answers

(i)

Indeed, that

t0

is

and

how this

(ii)

are yes, then proﬁt

t0 “calculate[]

Source

(noting that the expert witness “used the

Sur. C0.,

(1982);

The

“Gem

v.

—

w,

i.e.,

margin can be evidence 0f damages

1's lost profits”);

would have
v.

1's

proﬁt

Saint Alphonsus, 334 P.3d at 789

sums actually received by

that [the Plaintiff]

used “Source

v.

[the

Defendant] and

received”). See also

Luzar

its

proﬁt

v.

W.

Intermountain Gas C0., 646 P.2d 988, 1005

Safeco Ins. C0,, 577 P.2d 347, 350 (Idaho 1978).

District

Court found that

Gem State was precluded from recovering damages because

State Blaine failed t0 offer into evidence

have been had

question

that the district court

692 P.2d 337, 342 (Idaho 1984); Pope

Nora

lost

Court has always used proﬁt margin evidence. See Prehn

Hodge, 385 P.3d 876, 885 (Idaho 2016) (noting

margin t0 calculate the proﬁts

and

contract breaches? Proﬁt margin cannot answer those primary

questions. Proﬁt margin

margin for 201 1”

any part 0f those

likely than other factors that those lost proﬁts (0r

proﬁts) were caused

M.

Gem State lose proﬁts?

did

it

any proof as

been awarded the contracts for the work.”
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t0

what

R., at p.

its

costs

and proﬁts would

000637. Moreover, the

District

UCI

Court found that

money on the Animal

10st

then, the District Court asked, can

proj ects?

The

District Court

uncertainty at the

wrong

the risk 0f the uncertainty

the uncertainty created

the

TSA.

Finally,

UCI

would have helped
asking.

his

own wrong has

by UCI’S conduct.

UCI refused t0

doing. Secondly,

the right questions, but ultimately laid the fault for the

See Saint Alphonsus, 334 P.3d

which

ignored

Gem

State

UCI produced n0

refer the

its

created”).

In the ﬁrst place,

work to

790

at

UCI

Gem State,

UCI’S

as

did

wrongdoer

Gem State,

work

UCI was

it

shall bear

is

refusal t0 allow

obligated to d0 under

discovery obligations and refused t0 produce documents that

answer the costs and proﬁts questions the District Court was

emails and no other evidence of costs, despite discovery requests and

D below. Given UCI’S refusal t0

Gem State access t0 the information about the projects

and given

during litigation,

Gem State, must answer for the uncertainty:

The
lost out

liable for

was prohibited from

Gem State access t0 the proj ects at the time they were bid or worked 0n by UCI,

UCI, not

after

(“the

UCI, not

Court orders calling for precisely such information. See Section
allow

How,

Gem State be awarded damages from missing out on such

was asking

feet.

Shelter proj ect. R., at p. 000638.

District

Court should have ﬁrst determined Whether

on work because UCI bid 0n

making

it,

performed

it,

that determination, should the District

and

Gem State more-likely-than-not

failed t0 refer

UCI bid

0r performed contrary t0 the

challenge of afﬁxing a damages

had been proved. That analysis

to

Gem State.

Gem State did not get the

TSA. The Court simply looked

number and from

there

backed

backward, clear

error,

and should be reversed.

is
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Only

Court ask the “amount 0f proﬁt” question;

however, the Court did not undergo the preliminary analysis as t0 W_hy
various jobs that

it

into a

ﬁnding

that

at the

no damages

C.

GEM STATE HAS A COMMON LAW TRADEMARK IN ITS NAME,
IRRESPECTIVE OF REGISTRABILITY.

Gem State proved that its rights in the name GEM STATE ROOFING in Blaine County
are prior in right to

found that

State

ﬁnding was:

Rooﬁng’

(i)

name

in Blaine County. Nevertheless, the District

trademark as
First,

it is

in the Blaine

County area” and

that the

name ‘Gem

“even

(ii)

The

Gem State provided evidence that it was the

the District Court

acknowledged

(R., at p.

000640).

Gem State’s

in Blaine

County prior

evidence”
the

evidence 0f use, nor did

is

t0

clear error.

Gem State.

The

O_nly

it

is

District

County, and that that happened in the

Court

District Court’s

name

Gem State Blaine was the ﬁrst
not a protectable

Court erred in both counts.

ﬁrst t0 use the

late

Gem State also

used the mark in Blaine County until “around 2002.” Trial
rebutted

if

Rooﬁng’

State

primarily geographically descriptive.”

ROOFING name in Blaine

The

“[t]here is insufﬁcient evidence regarding the ﬁrst use 0f the

name, the Court ﬁnds

t0 use the

in the

Gem State has no trademark rights in GEM STATE ROOFING.

basis for this

‘Gem

UCI’s claims

GEM STATE

1990s

(R., at p.

000622), as

that

UCI had not

Tr., p. 13 1, L. 10-19.

UCI neither

showed

provide any evidence that

it

had used the mark

Accordingly, the District Court’s ﬁnding 0f “insufﬁcient

evidence

— unrebutted, unchallenged — of Blaine County use of

GEM STATE ROOFING mark was Gem State’s prior use.
Secondly,

UCI

(actually, its predecessor

Gem State-Boise) has already conceded that

Gem State has a trademark that is prior in right t0 UCI’s:
Settlement Agreement,” and in that

ISA,

the

ISA at issue

stands for “Trademark

the Parties stipulated that their respective

“names

are

confusingly similar t0 each other and the parties provide similar services, leading t0 a likelihood
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of confusion as t0 source,

and sponsorship 0f the services.” See R.

origin,

by Virtue 0f the TSA, estopped from challenging

the legitimacy 0f

at p.

0003 12.

UCI

Gem State’s trademark.

is,

In a

case exactly on point, the Ninth Circuit evaluated a pre-litigation settlement agreement

concerning the enforceability 0f trademark in what the defendant would later argue (and the
court

would

later

ﬁnd) was a descriptive mark in Which the

plaintiff had acquired

n0 secondary

meaning:

On September 25, 1985, the district court entered summary
judgment declaring MWS's trademark invalid and not infringed,
cancelling the registration, and dismissing all 0f MWS'S claims for
damages. The court found that the term “multiﬁlar” was “merely
descriptive 0f the goods 0f plaintiff,” and had acquired n0
“could not have validly
secondary meaning. Therefore
registered such mark, and
could not have acquired any common
law or rights [sic] therein [nor could it] assert any rights, under the
laws 0f unfair competition.” Additionally, the court found that

MWS

“[t]he

mark

in issue [was] also

used in

its

common, primary

0r

generic sense and [could not] acquire a secondary meaning, nor
[could]

The

it

acquire any trademark significance.”

district court erred in inquiring into the validity

trademark.

.

.

.

If a

of the

compromise agreement arose out 0f the

exchange 0f letters, CFW is estopped t0 assert the invalidity 0f
MWS's trademark as a defense t0 MWS'S claims.
If .. a
settlement agreement was formed, CFW is estopped to Challenge
the validity 0f the trademark in such future proceedings as may be
required to dispose of MWS'S various claims.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

and quieting
litigation.” United States v. McInnes, 556 F.2d 436, 441 (9th
Cir.1977). See also Williams v. First National Bank, 216 U.S. 582,
595, 3O S.Ct. 441, 445, 54 L.Ed. 625 (1910); Golden v. Faust, 766
F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir.1985). Promotion 0f this policy requires
judicial enforcement of settlement agreements. If the merits 0f a
cause 0f action underlying a compromise agreement could, as a
matter 0f course, be inquired into in an action t0 enforce the
settlement, neither settlement nor the policies it promotes would be
There

is

an “overriding public interest in
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settling

trial

fostered.

The

would be

parties

subj ected t0 the expense, delay,

and

uncertainty they sought to avoid through settlement; the court

would be burdened With trial of the underlying dispute and
preparation which precedes it. Accordingly, the courts 0f

the

California regard a settlement agreement as tantamount t0 a

judgment. Gorman

v.

Holte, 164 Cal.App.3d 984, 988, 211

Cal.Rptr. 34, 37 (1985). “[I]n the absence 0f a showing 0f fraud 0r
undue inﬂuence [a settlement] is decisive of the rights of the
parties thereto and operates as a bar t0 the reopening 0f the original
controversy.” Folsom v. Butte County Association ofGovernments,
32 Cal.3d 668, 677, 186 Cal.Rptr. 589, 595, 652 P.2d 437, 443
(1982) (quoting Shriver v. Kuchel, 113 Cal.App.2d 421, 425, 248

P.2d 35, 38 (1952)).

.

.

.

.

The

MWS's

.

..

validity of the trademark

cause 0f action.

the trademark in 1983. Instead,
litigation.

was

the disputed legal center of

CFW could have challenged the validity 0f
it

elected t0 avoid the risks 0f

A party's mistaken evaluation 0f the legal merit 0f its

claim 0r defense

is

not the sort 0f mistake which warrants recission

0f an agreement settling a dispute. A.J. Industries Inc. v. Ver
Halen, 75 Cal.App.3d 751, 759, 142 Ca1.Rptr. 383, 388 (1977) (“A
party t0 a settlement agreement may not seek t0 rescind it by
proving the merits of his original claim and then establishing that

an erroneous assessment by him of that claim led to the
settlement”).

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

CFW could have challenged the validity of the contested

trademark prior t0 entering into the alleged agreement not to
infringe.

.

.

.

T0 permit

0f the trademark

at this

CFW to reopen the question 0f the validity
juncture would severely undercut the

policy favoring the amicable resolution of trademark disputes

Without resort to the courts.
Association

v.

Cf. Visa International

Service

Bankcard Holders ofAmerica, 784 F.2d 1472, 1473

(9th Cir.1986) (party entering into settlement agreement with

respect t0 trademark “will be held t0 his contract unless

enforcement of the contract would result in injury t0 the public
through confusion”); Wells Cargo, Inc.

v.

Wells Cargo, Ina, 606

F.2d 961, 965 (C.C.P.A.1979) (“If there be a policy favoring
challenges t0 trademark validity, it
has been Viewed as

outweighed by the policy favoring settlements”);
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T& &

v. A.T. Cross Company, 587 F.2d 533, 539 (lst
“the
judicial policy 0f encouraging extra-judicial
Cir.1978) (noting

Manufacturing C0.

settlement 0f trademark litigation”), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908, 99
S.Ct. 2000,
.

.

.

.

60 L.Ed.2d 377 (1979).

.

.

.

CFW is estopped by Virtue 0f that agreement from asserting

the invalidity of the trademark as a defense t0

MWS Wire Indus., Inc.

v.

“We

claims.

California Fine Wire C0., 797 F.2d 799, 800—04 (9th Cir. 1986) (some

internal citations omitted).

1990) (noting that

MWS's

See also Taylor

v.

The Ahmednager Queen, 895 F.2d 1418 (9th

Cir.

favor the amicable settlement of claims and Will not disrupt the binding

nature 0f that settlement because a party incorrectly evaluates his case”). Idaho laws, as cited

above,

is

in accord: “[C]0urts

make them more
0r overreaching

d0 not possess the roving power

equitable.” Losee

v.

Idaho Ca, 220 P.3d 575, 579 (Idaho 2009). “Absent fraud

— neither 0f Which has been shown

here

— we cannot modify the

a contract upon which competent parties have agreed.” Lupis
944, 947 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).

Agreement, by Which

it

t0 rewrite contracts in order t0

UCI voluntarily entered into

acknowledged the validity 0f Gem

v.

express terms 0f

Peoples Mortg. C0., 690 P.2d

the

Trademark Settlement

State’s

mark and

the likelihood of

confusion the two parties presented by using the same mark in the same vicinity. The District

Court should have found that

UCI was

estopped from challenging

Gem State’s rights in the

GEM STATE ROOFING trademark.
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY
FAILING TO SANCTION UCI AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR UCI’S DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS.
As

the District Court stated at the opening 0f its Findings 0f Fact

“The primary

issues before the Court are whether

& Conclusions 0f Law,

Gem State Blaine has presented sufﬁcient
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evidence” t0 support
State

had

wrong

its

claims. R., at p. 000632.

The primary reason

not.

The

for the “failure”

legal standard, as outlined above;

is

District

Court went 0n to ﬁnd that

Gem

the District Court’s application 0f the

however, a second, signiﬁcant reason that

did not produce evidence sufﬁcient to satisfy the District Court

is

because

Gem State

UCI destroyed and

Withheld discoverable information during the discovery process. The discovery disputes ran the
entire course

of the

litigation

and are

set forth in the

Statement of Facts and Course of

Proceedings sections above.

The District Court Should Have Awarded
UCI’s Discovery Abuses.

1.

Despite granting

Court

rej ected

attorneys’ fees

Gem State’s Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions,

that the

issues could

Fees for

the District

both the mandate 0f the Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure regarding awarding

and

costs,

and good guidance from the United States

Northern District 0f California.

and

Gem State Attorneys’

Had the

District

Court levied the sanctions that the Rules require,

Northern District 0f California advised — as

have been remediated prior

having t0 bear the

full

District Court for the

t0 trial; at a

Gem State requested — the discovery

minimum,

Gem State would not now be

cost 0f UCI’S breaches.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) requires an award 0f costs and fees where, as
here, a defendant produces over 1,000 pages of documents

after a

Motion

to

Compel

is

ﬁled.

The

— some 90% 0f its

total

rule provides:

motion is granted, 0r if the requested discoverv is provided
after the motion was ﬁled, the court must, after giving an
opportunity to be heard, require the partv 0r deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion, the partv 0r attornev advising
If the
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production

—

that conduct, 0r both t0 pav the movant's reasonable expenses
incurred in making the motion, including attornev's fees. But
the court
the

(i)

must not order

movant ﬁled

this

payment

if:

the motion before attempting in

good

faith to

obtain the disclosure 0r discovery Without court action;
the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, 0r objection

(ii)

was

substantially justiﬁed; 0r
(iii)

other circumstances

make an award 0f expenses

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) (emphasis added).
exceptions applied

District

t0

Court was

Compel

State’s

to

m
—

certainly, the District

Gem State,

Motion

t0

t0

unjust.

None of the

stated

Rule 37(a)(5)

Court never found that any applied — and s0 the

award attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred 0n the motion

against

UCI

0r

its

attorney,

When the

Compel. As the Idaho Court 0f Appeals said

District

Court granted

Gem

in 1992:

[A]s a sanction for a separate discovery abuse, the court ordered

Jim

t0

abuse.

pay reasonable attorney
.

.

fees incurred as a result 0f that

.

Jim has made no cogent argument against either of these awards.
The record and the law fully support the awards 0f fees in this
instance as sanctions. See, e.g., Chenery v. Agri—Lz'nes Corp, 115
Idaho 281, 766 P.2d 75 1 (1988). Moreover, the award of fees for
this purpose is not dependent upon I.C. § 12—121, and thus these
awards need not await the ﬁnal outcome of the case.
DesFosses

v.

DesFosseS, 836 P.2d 1095, 1100 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992). The District Court

declined to award attorneys’ fees, and that
Similarly, Idaho

and costs

in connection

was a

clear abuse 0f discretion.

Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C) requires an award 0f attorneys’ fees
with a Motion for Sanctions, after a party’s refusal t0 comply with an

order t0 compel:
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Instead of 0r in addition to the orders above, the court

must order

the disobedient partv, the attornev advising that partv, 0r both
t0 pav the reasonable expenses, including attornev's fees,

caused bv the

failure, unless the failure

or other circumstances

was

substantially justiﬁed

make an award of expenses

unjust.

(emphasis added). Again, none 0f the stated exceptions apply — the District Court never
expressly found any
attorneys’ fees

— and therefore

it

was

clear error for the District Court t0

rules.

and

costs,

Defendant paid Virtually no penalty for

Defendant produced almost no e-mails — in

and the

District

Court found that

avoidance 0f liability. The result
2.

is

an award of

contempt of the discovery

Defendant deleted responsive e-mails —

The

District Court’s

rewarded Defendant’s duplicity, and, by that duplicity,

a complete perversion 0f the discovery rules.

Court Should Have Made UCI — not Gem State — Suffer the
Consequences 0f UCI’s Disregard 0f Discovery Rules.

The

In response t0

responsive e-mail

fact,

its

By not ordering

Gem State was unable t0 prove its case.

failure t0 follow the discovery rules thus

Gem State its

Gem State’s Motion for Protective Order,

and costs when the Court granted

following Defendant’s refusal t0 comply with the Order t0 Compel.
attorneys’ fees

deny

District

UCI’S

— the

failure t0

District

produce responsive e-mail — and admitted deletion 0f

Court permitted

Gem State t0 conduct discovery 0f all 0f UCI’S

email accounts and of third-party hosting services. The problems with that order were
entire costs

0f such Wide-ranging discovery were to be borne by

notwithstanding that

it

was UCI

wide-ranging discovery was entered some two (2) months before

some four
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(4)

the

Gem State — not UCI —

that necessitated the unusual order,

dispute had been playing out before the Court for

(i)

and

trial

(ii)

the order for such

(though the discovery

months by

then).

That two-

month pre-trial window 0f time was insufﬁcient

to resolve the third-party disputes,

and the cost

of that discovery was prohibitive.

The

District

Court should have followed the direction of the federal courts, notably, the

Northern District 0f California, which levied sanctions in an analogous case:

Hummer deleted emails Which it had a duty t0 preserve
produce to

plaintiffs.

and

plaintiffs

action,

and
These emails related t0 the merits of the
have been prejudiced by their destruction.

.

.

.

B. Evidentiary Sanctions

have requested two forms 0f evidentiary sanctions.
plaintiffs request that Hummer be precluded from contesting
some 0f a number 0f issues related t0 the parties’ claims and
Plaintiffs

First,
all

0r

defenses. Second, plaintiffs request that the jury be given an

adverse inference instruction.

1.

The

Preclusion

court’s inherent authority t0

impose sanctions for the wrongful

destruction of evidence includes the
that,

power

t0 exclude evidence

given the spoliation, would “unfairly prejudice an opposing

The propriety 0f preclusion sanctions, therefore, depends
0n the extent t0 which plaintiffs were prejudiced by Hummer’s
deletion of its Napster-related emails. This analysis must be made
in light of the requirement t0 impose the “least onerous sanction”
given the extent 0f the offending party’s fault and the prejudice t0

party.”

the opposing party.

As

discussed above, the

full

extent of prejudice

is

unclear based on

the record before the court for the purposes of this motion.
plaintiffs have shown sufﬁcient prejudice
some degree 0f preclusion sanctions.

However,

.

2.
.

.

.

.

As

.

to warrant

.

Adverse Inference Instruction

discussed above,

Hummer deleted Napster-related

communications which it had a duty t0 preserve, knowing that
such a duty existed. Hummer’s conduct amounts t0 gross
negligence, if not willfulness, Which is sufﬁcient culpability t0
justify an adverse inference. In addition, the deleted emails were
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relevant to the action as discussed above. Therefore, plaintiffs are
entitled to

an adverse inference instruction. The precise wording of

the instruction Will be determined at

trial.

C. Monetary Sanctions

Monetary sanctions may be imposed where one party has
wrongfully destroyed evidence. Plaintiffs claim that they are
entitled t0 their attorneys’ fees associated with bringing this
motion, and With the meet and confer process involved in

determining the availability 0f Hummer’s Napster-related emails.

The court ﬁnds

monetary sanctions are warranted here.
forestalled a great deal 0f time and effort by
simply acknowledging early 0n that it was not preserving its
internally generated Napster-related communications.
that

Hummer could have

In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 462 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1077-78 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (internal
citations omitted). This is exactly

requested the relatively
the Court to ascertain

what

Gem State

asked the District Court t0 d0:

and certainly inexpensive, sanction

light,

that

“when

it

Gem State

comes time

for

Gem State-Blaine’s total damages as a result 0f UCI’S breach 0f the

Settlement Agreement, the Court can and should conclude that the inference linking UCI’s

conduct t0

Gem State-Blaine’s

damages

is

more probable than

State-Blaine’s loss t0 other factors.” R., p. 000450.

would have been easy

for the Court t0 apply,

wasted resources, and would have been a
its

discovery rules. In short,

prejudice

it

would otherwise

Instead,

0n a

it

download

Virtue of that requested sanction

would not have wasted

suffer

all

— that
trial,

it

time,

Gem
is

that

did suffer

— by UCI’S

Gem State for the unfair

conduct.

Gem State was permitted t0 spend thousands

of dollars

0f UCI’S undeleted emails and screen them for privilege. The
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it

would not have

response t0 UCI’S repeated and ﬂagrant ﬂaunting

would have adequately compensated

two months before

third party t0

fair

The

the inference connecting

if

search

were

was expensive, but revealed nothing —

as

UCI had already admitted,

deleted. R., p. 000458. Also, the third parties refused t0 respond t0

for information. R., pp. 000762-772. In short,

UCI’S ruse worked:

responsive emails

Gem State’s subpoenas

Gem State had to pay

thousands 0f dollars in additional discovery costs and attorneys’ fees, the efforts bore n0

and

Gem State was required t0 try a case Without the responsive information that UCI had

deleted or withheld.

evidence to prove
this appeal

and

its

The

its

result

case. A11

was a

District

of this wasted

Court decision that

money and time,

3.

Though

it

Gem

State

had not produced

the inequitable conclusion, and

attendant costs and delay could have been avoided had the Court followed the

lead of the federal court in the analogous Napster case, as

that

fruit,

Gem State requested.

Court Should Have Awarded Costs and Fees Under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(2).

The

District

concluded that

Gem

State

Gem State had established a few things,

had not proved

its

case, the District Court agreed

UCI

including facts that

denied in response t0

Requests for Admission but which were established in subsequent discovery and ultimately
stipulated to at

trial.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(2) provides in
Failure t0 Admit. If a party

Rule 36 and

if the

fails t0

part:

admit what

is

requested under

requesting party later proves

the requesting party

the matter true,

may move that the party Who

pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s
making that proof.

Gem State included 28 Requests

for

Admission

in

its

these three requests:
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First Set

failed t0

admit

fees, incurred in

0f Discovery Requests, including

-

-

Request for Admission N0. 10: Admit that You [UCI] are doing business
under the assumed business name “Gem State Rooﬁng.”

Request for Admission N0.

Admit that

12:

since 2016,

You

and performed rooﬁng work
under the assumed business name “Gem State Rooﬁng.”
advertised, solicited, bid 0n,

-

R., pp.

-

County

Request for Admission N0. 17: Admit that despite Gem State’s written
demands that You [UCI] cease conducting Your rooﬁng business in Blaine
County, You [UCI] continue t0 advertise, solicit, bid 0n, and perform rooﬁng
work in Blaine County.

000080-81.

however,

[UCI] have

in Blaine

UCI

denied each of these Requests for Admission (R., pp. 000080-81);

Gem State proved the truth 0f these

Documents produced by UCI

in

of Request for Admission Nos. 10 and 12

its

facts through:

own Discovery Responses, Which

(R., p.

establish the truth

000121) and Request for Admission 17

(R., p.

000160).
-

Documents produced by third parties

establish the truth of Request for

Admission 17

Admission Nos. 10

(R., pp.

Subpoenas Duces Tecum, which
000135-142) and Request for

000155).

Jeff Flynn’s deposition testimony.

When Gem

State’s counsel asked

operating under the assumed business

name “Gem

State

-

UCI

(R., pp.

in response t0

Rooﬁng,” Mr. Flynn admitted

UCI has performed work in Blaine County under that business name
0001 13.6 Mr. Flynn further testiﬁed

on any 0f the equipment

6

Deposition Transcript

it

that

UCI

received from

at p. 59, L.6-9.
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and

that

that

in the last three years. R., p.

did not change any 0f the

Gem State-Boise,

Mr. Flynn about

Gem State Rooﬁng logos

he had been operating

all

of

his corporate entities under the

1

“Gem

State

Rooﬁng” name

since the 1980’s. R., pp. 0001 10,

12-1 13 .7

Defendant would ultimately stipulate
District

Court found these facts to be true in

to these facts at trial (R., p. 000623),

its

Findings of Fact

and the

& Conclusions of Law. R., pp.

000629-63 1.

The

District

Court had n0 discretion t0 not award fees for UCI’S denial 0f the Requests

for Admission:

Where, as here, one party fails t0 admit the truth 0f a matter as
requested, and the opposing party subsequently proves the truth of
the matter, the court “shall” award “the reasonable expenses”
incurred.

The

rule

is

mandatory, subj ect only t0 the four exceptions
was held

set forth in the rule itself: (1) that the request

obj ectionable pursuant t0 Rule 36(a); (2) that the admission sought

was not “0f substantial importance;” (3) that failure t0 admit was
based upon a reasonable belief in prevailing on the issue; 0r (4)
other good reason. However, as the trial judge's comments
indicate,

he did not explicitly link his analysis to any 0f these

exceptions.

We reiterate, however, that the judge may not refuse to make
an award solely because the expenses of proving the matter
contained in the requests for admission might also have been
.

.

.

.

incurred With respect to another issue.

Ruge
E.

v.

Posey, 761 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added).

GEM STATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL.
The

TSA provides that:
If any litigation or

proceeding

is

commenced between

0r

among

the parties 0r their representatives arising out 0f, 0r relating t0, this

Agreement, including, without

7

Deposition Transcript

at p. 44, L. 5-7; p. 57, L.

limitation, a

24-25; p. 58, L. 1-4.
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breach of any

covenant, condition, representation, warranty, agreement, 0r
provision of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled,
in addition t0 such other relief as

may be

granted, to have and

recover from the other party reasonable attorneys' fees and

all

costs

of such action.
R. pp. 000239.

Gem State has already established that UCI has breached the TSA,

not appealing that determination. Under the terms of the

an award 0f attorney’s

TSA,

therefore,

and

Gem State

is

UCI

is

entitled t0

fees.

IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,
District Court’s

attorneys’ fees

Gem State respectfully requests that this

Court reverse the

Judgment; order that appropriate sanctions for discovery Violations, including

and the inference

Gem State has requested;

and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with such sanctions and pursuant to the law 0f determining damages set
forth above.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

30th

day of June 2020.

By /s/Rvan T. McFarland
Ryan
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Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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